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Abstract  
The aim of this article is to examine Brexit through the lens of decentred theory as articulated 
by Bevir (2013) in A Theory of Governance.  Decentered theory regards the British state as 
neither a monolith (as per modernist social science) nor a myth (as per post-modern theory) 
but rather as a repository of norms, customs, practices and thought acquired by elite actors, 
professionals and policy-networks. The central thesis of the article is that the idea of the 
decentered state, as an explanation of state governance, can be seen in the phenomenon of 
Brexit. The article uses literatures on governance and contemporary history to examine the 
relevance of the concept of the decentered state. Then it considers the case study of British 
politics in the 1970s as a precursor to the decentering effects of Brexit on state governance. 
The article then moves to consider three dimensions of the phenomenon of Brexit which can 
be understood as decentering practices in and of themselves: the referendum vote; the 
negotiations; and competing ‘imaginings’ of the United Kingdom in a post-EU membership 
environment. The article’s findings represent a fresh and novel means by which scholars can 
utilise the idea of the decentered state as an intellectual tool to explain the phenomenon of 
Brexit.   
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The decision for the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union (EU) is the most 
important political and constitutional decision taken in living memory.  The decision was 
taken in a nation-wide referendum held on 23rd June 2016. The result was a victory for the 
two ‘Leave’ campaigns and was predicated on a turnout of 72% of registered electors, with  
52% voting to ‘Leave’ and 48% voting to ‘Remain’. The campaign was long. It ran from 15th 
April to 23rd June. It was often bitter and ill-tempered. The airwaves, the press, the internet in 
general, and social media in particular, were replete with arguments, data, counterpoints, 
misinformation and criticism. With the triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on 29th 
March 2017, the minority Conservative government led by Theresa May, activated the legal 
mechanism for the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU.  In the days that followed, the 
arguments continued often generating more heat than light.  Arguments abound pertaining to 
the shape and form of Brexit; the implementation or ‘transition’ period; the post-membership 
relationships; and, most controversially, whether the British electorate wish to revisit their 
decision.   
This article’s central thesis is that the idea of the decentered state1, as an explanation of state 
governance, can be used to interpret the phenomenon of Brexit.  For Bevir (2013), the merit 
of decentered theory is that it:   
…emphasizes the diversity of governing practices and the importance of historical 
explanations of these practices.  Governance is seen as a set of diverse practices that 
people are constantly creating and recreating through their concrete activity. (Bevir, 
2013:1)   
Bevir’s use of decentred theory interprets how state actors respond to significant change.  It 
gives credence to agency, ideas and beliefs and emphasises the evolution and adaptation of 
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traditions, practices and behaviours.  This theory of a ‘diversity of governing practices’ is a 
feature of the British state. There was a ‘diversity of governing practices’ and contested 
narratives prior to the United Kingdom joining the European Community on 1st January 1973 
through to ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in July 1993 and on to the June 2016 referendum, 
to today and beyond, when the United Kingdom eventually exits the EU.  
It is because Brexit is fundamentally a struggle about wresting sovereignty from the EU back 
to the Houses of Parliament and, by so doing, altering the governing practices of the last four 
decades that makes it necessarily a decentering event. What is argued below is that regardless 
of whether one thinks, or desires from a normative perspective, that Brexit will lead to the 
United Kingdom being meaningfully independent of a supra-national federal politics, the 
sheer act of ‘Brexiting’ is a decentering event in and of itself. Evans and Menon (2017) are 
correct when they suggest that:  
Brexit will also provide the British state with arguably its most severe peace-time 
challenge. The Cabinet Secretary reckons it has few, if any, parallels in its 
complexity. (Evans and Menon, 2017: 108)  
The article will begin by discussing the relevance of the concept of the decentered state as an 
explanatory theory of state governance in the United Kingdom. Then it will consider the case 
study of British politics in the 1970s as a precursor to the decentering effects of Brexit on 
state governance which was an example of an extended period marked by shock, schism, 
rupture and characterised by disputes. Next the article analyses three aspects of Brexit and 
how each one contributes to the decentering of state governance: the referendum vote, the 
negotiation and the competing ideational visions of the United Kingdom after EU 
membership.  
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The Decentered State and British Politics  
The concept of the decentered state is a post-foundationalist theory of the state. It is relevant 
in seeking to explain and understand the workings of the British state as it acknowledges that 
the British state is neither a monolith (as per modernist social science) nor a myth (as per 
post-modern theory). The concept of the decentered state contains a good measure of 
explanatory accuracy which surpasses classical institutionalist, Marxist and post-modern 
accounts of the state.   
The British state is objectively real though not merely in a physical sense e.g. the buildings of 
institutions such as the Houses of Parliament or HM Treasury or in the outputs of such 
institutions, namely published Acts of Parliament and documents of fiscal policy.  The British 
state, according to decentered theory, is real in an ideational sense. This is because it is 
composed of ideas, beliefs, historical traditions and governing practices (Bevir, 2013). In this 
ideational sense, the British state can be understood as a repository of norms, customs and 
thought acquired by elite actors, professionals and policy networks. Rhodes and Marsh 
(1992), as proponents of policy networks as a meso-level concept of interest group 
intermediation, seek to move beyond the dichotomy of pluralist and corporatist models of 
interest representation (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 2-4) and they suggest that policy networks, 
in and of themselves, are not adequate to explain policy change:  
…the meso-level concept of ‘policy networks’ needs to be clearly located in a number 
of macro-theories of the state, and the articulation between the levels needs to be 
specified. This latter exercise is an important reminder that policy networks are but a 
component, albeit an important one, of any explanation of policy making and policy 
change in Britain. (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 268)  
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The concept of the decentered state is a viable macro-theory of the state. The British state is 
large, multi-layered, multi-institutional and comprises governing practices and traditions of 
thought which a plurality of stakeholders - i.e. Backbench Members of Parliament, Ministers 
of the Crown, civil servants, public and private sector professionals - author and re-author. 
These governing practices, much like traditions of thought, are not harmonious but contested 
and neither do they correspond to a rational plan. Moreover, the historical context of the state 
activity matters. Referring to the evolving activity and responsibility of democratic states 
Gamble (2016) argues that:  
In the twentieth century, the state gradually assumed major roles in stabilising and 
regulating market economies to prevent slumps and promote growth and prosperity; 
in providing social protection and social investment through welfare, education and 
health programmes; and in investing to promote technological innovation, provide 
better infrastructure and foster faster growth. States have as a result become 
multipurpose, multi-agency and multi-layered, with highly complex systems of 
governance and co-ordination. (Gamble, 2016:7)   
The British state can be efficient in discharging its duties and providing goods and services 
but because it is dynamic and multifarious and ultimately authored by intentional 
stakeholders - acting in groups and organisations with contrasting norms and goals - it is 
susceptible to shock, schism, rupture and is characterised by disputes. As it is authored by 
humans it is marked by failure. Having considered the relevance of the concept of the 
decentred state as an explanatory theory of the British state, the article moves to consider the 
case study of British politics in the 1970s. This provides an example of an extended period 
marked by shock, schism, rupture and characterised by disputes which serves as a precursor 
to the decentering effects of Brexit on state governance.  
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Decentering of the British State: The 1970s as Case Study  
When surveying the modern British state, one is aware that ‘modern’ refers to the post-war 
era. Of all the periods in the aftermath of the Second World War, it is contended here that a 
good example of the British state experiencing shock, schism, rupture and marked by 
dilemmas and disputes between individuals, groups, their beliefs and ideational traditions is 
the politics of the 1970s.  In the post-war era the 1970s was the most difficult decade to 
govern the United Kingdom. The OPEC oil crisis; the industrial relations question; 
stagflation; racial tension; clashing moral values; the Troubles in Northern Ireland; arguments 
over membership of the Common Market; football hooliganism; the emergence of radical 
feminism; and punk were markers of a nation exhibiting the birth pangs of social and 
economic transformation.  These ideas, attitudes and events were underpinned by a sense that 
Britain’s ancien regime was neither desirable nor effective in empowering individual liberty. 
This spirit was, in itself, a rupture in the British or more precisely in the English mind.2 The 
ties that had for so long bonded - endogenously and exogenously - the four nations of the 
Union and its collective institutions including the Protestant churches, the Crown, holy 
matrimony, Parliament and political parties, manufacturing and trade unions, that provided a 
thick sense of community and identity, began to matter much less.  Economic individualism, 
moral liberation and post-modernity affected the settled institutions of the United Kingdom 
with radical formulas of what it and its people ought to become.   
The British state was subject to decentering from within through ruptures in social ethics and 
cultural practice and from without in the form of economic crises. Related to stagflation and 
ongoing strike action was the decentring effect that the decline of Keynesianism had on the 
governance of economic management.  Keynesianism had been the preferred economic 
doctrine since 1945 but by the mid-1970s, with the emergence of the IMF Crisis, it became 
apparent that the instruments of demand management that Labour and Conservative 
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governments had utilised in the age of Butskellism and beyond were leading to higher doses 
of inflation which, in turn, prompted concomitant demands for wage increase. The industrial 
relations backdrop was symbolised by the divided nature of the Wilson Cabinet which led to 
the inability to muster sufficient support to legislate on its 1969 White Paper In Place of  
Strife; the failure of the Heath Government to enforce the trade union reforms laid out in the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971; and the willingness of Wilson’s minority Labour Government 
to replace the Industrial Relations Act 1971 with the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
1974.  The two great parties of British parliamentary democracy were ill-equipped to 
navigate the challenge to state governance and economic management that the twin pressures 
of stagflation and militant strike action caused in the 1970s. Politicians, civil servants, trade 
unionists and business leaders failed to embrace change at a level of ideas, norms and 
practices so to facilitate a more effective approach to industrial relations.    
By 1976, the British state was once gain faced with a major decentering crisis: the IMF Crisis 
(Coates, 1975; Hickson, 2005). Chancellor Denis Healey made an application, the second 
within a year, to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $3.9 billion loan. The  
Government needed the loan due the parlous state of its public finances. Large budget deficits 
had been run up in an era of high unemployment and high inflation. Tax receipts were low 
and as was to be expected the welfare bill was rising.  Add to this the pressure that was 
brought to bear on Sterling in March 1976 after significant sales of the currency by the Bank 
of England and further currency speculation on Sterling in July of the same year. But, more 
than anything else, the economic and political morass that was the industrial relations 
question meant that the British economy had become sclerotic. The industrial relations 
settlement characterised by the Social Contract’s tripartite approach, with its ‘beer and 
sandwiches’ mind-set, had failed to reconcile the divergent needs and wants of union leaders, 
ministers, business leaders and most of all the general public.   
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Callaghan’s Government weathered the IMF financial storm. By spring of 1978 inflation had 
fallen to 10% - from the high of 36% in summer 1975 - and by the autumn over half of the 
IMF loan had been repaid. The economy was more stable than it had been for a number of 
years. The decentering consequences however, for many citizens who voted Labour in 1974, 
in the form of cuts to public expenditure were stark. Callaghan’s decision against calling an 
autumn general election exposed Labour to the infamous winter of 1978 which brought a 
further wave of industrial action by public sector unions. The effect was serious for people 
relying on front-line public services and deleterious for Labour. In the public mind they were 
seen as a government unable to prevent trade unions from taking irresponsible strike action 
and seemingly associated with one crisis after another.  
A further decentering effect of the IMF Crisis was that it solidified, in the minds of a number 
of social democrats including the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Home Secretary, that 
Keynesian political economy had clear limits. The persistent running of budget deficits led to 
sharp bouts of inflation, and concomitantly, to increased unemployment. But whilst the IMF 
Crisis was the portent that Labour’s political economy must adapt, it was not the death-knell 
for Keynesianism as Tomlinson (2004) notes:  
Once the IMF seal of approval had been given, and the exchange rate strengthened, 
Labour started to reflate the economy and to limit inflation by continuing with the 
social contract. Keynesianism was not dead. (Tomlinson, 2004: 66)  
It is more accurate to suggest that the political economy of British social democracy had 
reached its frontier. The IMF Crisis was a pivotal decentering event and the intellectual and 
policy consequences of the decision-making of Callaghan’s Government affected British 
politics as a whole, and politicians as a group, be they social democrats, conservatives or 
liberals. The British state with its Keynesian, welfare capitalist disposition, was faced with 
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intellectual challenges by thinkers on Labour’s New Left such as Stuart Holland (1975) and the 
Conservative’s New Right such as Sir Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption (1979).   
Middlemas (2001) is correct to argue that:  
…the new right critics who steered with the changed tide after 1974 and the deeper, 
colder current below the surface, were not wrong to focus on the intrinsic gap 
between the state’s aspirations as legislator (in Adam Smith’s use of the word) and its 
effectiveness actually to change individual and collective patterns of behaviour in 
civil society. (Middlemas, 2001:217)  
  
The first Thatcher government was the beneficiary of Labour’s governmental travails and the 
decentering effects of the 1970s and sought to alter ‘patterns of behaviour’ by rolling back the 
state as Rhodes (1997) notes:  
Although the British government is expert at inventing rationales for its 
administrative reforms, none the less the many and varied changes are linked by the 
consistent aims of pushing back the frontiers of the state and cutting public spending. 
(Rhodes, 1997:87)  
Edward Heath, Harold Wilson, James Callaghan and at the tail-end of the decade, Margaret  
Thatcher, found themselves confronted by the complexities of the United Kingdom in the 
1970s. Whilst government is necessarily challenging, the aggregation of the moral, social, 
economic ferment of this decade led to political upheaval, sharp divisions and a question 
mark hanging over the effective governability of the British state and respect for the rule of 
law within the nation.  It is argued here that the idea of the decentered state can help social 
scientists make sense of the changes that take place in the governance of the British state and, 
in our time, chief among those is the phenomenon of Brexit.  The article asserts that Brexit is 
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a decentering phenomenon in and of itself. Much in the same way as the economic crises of 
1970s, the British state is experiencing shock, schism, rupture and is characterised by 
disputes of an unusually vehement political and social nature within and without political 
parties. The article moves now to analyse three aspects of Brexit, namely the vote; the 
negotiation; and the imaginings of a post-EU world, and how each one contributes to the 
decentering of state governance.      
  
The Vote  
The poll held on 23rd June 2016 is a product of the EU Referendum Act 2015 which received 
Royal Assent on 17th December 2015. This made good the commitment to hold an ‘in-out 
referendum’ on the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU in the 2015 Conservative Party 
General Election manifesto (Conservative Party, 2015). There are, nevertheless, longer-term 
factors why the Conservative Prime Minister of the day, David Cameron, included the 
manifesto commitment. The rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP); a 
growing restlessness by Eurosceptic back benchers during the 2010 Parliament; and the 
liberalism of Cameron as Conservative Party Leader and Prime Minister are long-term 
contributory factors (Beech, 2017).   
Citizens of the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU by a poll which read, ‘Should the 
United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ On 
a turnout of 72% (33.55 million) a narrow margin of 52% to 48% (17.41 million to 16.14 
million) electors opted to Vote Leave (BBC, 2016). They did so for a plurality of reasons. In a 
poll of 12,369 voters taken on the day of the referendum, Ashcroft (2016) found that of Leave 
voters the factors informing their decision was as follows: regaining control of laws 49%, 
regaining control of borders and immigration 33%, unable to affect future EU memberships 
and direction 13% and economic advantage outside of the EU 6% (Ashcroft, 2016).   
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As the polling data suggests, an important reason for Leave voters was a dissatisfaction with 
mass immigration from the EU.  In particular, the effect of mass low skilled and unskilled 
migration. This tended to be a targeted complaint against migration from the 2004 Accession 
8 countries (A8)3 and the 2007 Accession 2 countries (A2)4. Much less focus was given to 
Cyprus and Malta who also joined the EU in 2004 and Croatia who acceded in 2013. The 
context of the complaint about mass immigration from the EU by Leave voters can be 
understood with reference to data from Oxford University’s Migration Laboratory. By the 
first quarter of 2015 3 million EU nationals were living in the United Kingdom of which 1.9 
million were in employment (Migration Observatory, 2016). These figures for 2015 
published the year of the referendum help to illustrate the legitimacy of the concern about 
mass immigration from the EU.  The following quotation from the Oxford Migration 
Laboratory contextualises migration flows since the A8 with data on migration from the EU 
since 1991:  
Inflows of EU nationals migrating to the UK stood at 250,000 in 2016, down from 
269,000 in 2015. EU inflows were mainly flat for the 1991-2003 period, averaging 
close to 61,000 per year. Citizens from new EU member states are included in the 
data from 2004 onwards, after which the estimated EU migration inflows increased 
considerably.  (Oxford Migration Observatory, 2017 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/eu-migration-to-
andfrom-the-uk/)  
If the two most important reasons why a majority of electors voted Leave are to regain 
parliamentary sovereignty and to control immigration from member states of the EU and, if 
one seeks to further understand the vote, then it follows that one needs to understand which 
type of voters voted Leave.  Again, using data from the data set captured by Ashcroft (2016) 
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on the day of the referendum, one can express the share of Leave voters according to party 
identification:  
Party Identifier  % of Leave voters  
Conservative  40  
UKIP  25  
Labour  21  
Liberal Democrats  5  
SNP  3  
Greens   2  
Other  2  
Plaid Cymru  1  
                    (Ashcroft, 2016)  
The decentering effect of the vote began prior to the referendum. The mere idea of a Bill that 
sought to legislate for an ‘In-Out’ referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued 
membership of the EU was a rupture in the UK-EU relationship. The referendum campaign 
exacerbated this rupture and the decentering effects were felt through the shocks and schisms 
of partisan argument.  This occurred at the level of household, workplace, community, region 
and nation.  For example, with regard to online dialogue, the Centre for the Analysis of Social 
Media at Demos reported  that throughout the campaign and in its aftermath  a troubling level 
of uncivil dialogue and hate speech occurred (Demos, 2016).  
The nadir of the referendum campaign was the murder of Jo Cox MP on 16th June in Birstall,  
West Yorkshire. Cox was murdered by Thomas Mair, a far-right activist who targeted her 
because she was a progressive politician supportive of the EU, the rights of immigrants and 
refugees. Cox’s murder brought into sharp focus the vulnerability of politicians (Cox was 
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murdered on her way to a constituency surgery); it reminded the public of the threat to civil 
peace from neo-Nazi elements; and it raised the question of the tone of political discourse 
during the referendum campaign.  In an act of rare political unity, and in honour of Jo Cox’s 
memory, the Labour Party’s mainstream rivals agreed not to contest the by-election in her 
Batley and Spen constituency.    
  
The Negotiation  
The second of the three aspects of Brexit, and how it contributes to the decentering of state 
governance, is the negotiation.  After triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on 29th  
March 2017, and with a sense of confidence in her party’s poll numbers relative to the Labour 
Party under Jeremy Corbyn, May called a general election.  The reasoning behind this was 
ostensibly to seek a mandate to deliver Brexit. The shock of the loss of the Conservative 
Party’s modest majority of 13 seats in the House of Commons on 8th June and the subsequent 
need to enter into a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party, 
reinforced the sense of division felt across the country. The result sent a message to the EU 
that May, as Prime Minister and her Cabinet colleagues, were soon to recommence the Brexit 
negotiations from a position of weakness. Though May fought a poor campaign and lost her 
party’s majority, 13.6 million electors supported the Conservatives which is the second 
highest total vote in British electoral history (Apostolova, 2017:6).  
The Labour Party performed surprisingly better gaining 30 seats and garnering 40% of the 
share of the vote which in the last twenty years was only higher in 1997. Corbyn’s position 
was strengthened much to the dismay of the majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party who 
continue to oppose his leadership. Corbyn, an erstwhile critic of the European project and 
acolyte of fellow Eurosceptic Tony Benn, allegedly voted Remain but campaigned gently 
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during the referendum and was rewarded with a wave of Remain voters in the 2017 general 
election. The most curious Remain seat that swung Labour was Kensington, returning Emma 
Dent Coad as its Member of Parliament, with a majority of 20.  
With the general election over the formal negotiations began. This was three months after  
Article 50 was triggered. On 19th June 2017 Her Majesty’s Government’s lead negotiator, the 
Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, David Davis met with his counterpart Michel Barnier, 
the European Commission appointed Chief Negotiator for the United Kingdom Exiting the 
EU. The negotiations between Her Majesty’s Government and the EU are time limited. After 
six months a joint report was published tentatively outlining areas of negotiated agreement at 
the close of what is termed ‘phase 1’:  
Both Parties have reached agreement in principle across the following three areas 
under consideration in the first phase of negotiations, on which further detail is set out 
in this report:  
a. protecting the rights of Union citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the Union;  
b. the framework for addressing the unique circumstances in Northern Ireland; and c. 
the financial settlement.  
Progress was also made in achieving agreement on aspects of other separation issues. 
The positions detailed in this report form a single and coherent package. Agreement 
in principle has been reached on the package as a whole, as opposed to individual 
elements. Under the caveat that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, the joint 
commitments set out below in this joint report shall be reflected in the Withdrawal 
Agreement in full detail. This does not prejudge any adaptations that might be 
appropriate in case transitional arrangements were to be agreed in the second phase of 
the negotiations, and is without prejudice to discussions on the framework of the 
future relationship. (HM Government, 2017:1)  
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Whilst some progress was made, it is important to note the principle outlined in the report 
that, ‘that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. It is because Brexit is an existential 
crisis for the EU that Barnier and his team sought to convey the sense that they were 
upholding the integrity of the European project. This is a central part of the strategy of 
deterring future exits from the EU and playing to the large group of dedicated British 
Remainers within government and across the state that leaving the EU is not in the best 
interests of the United Kingdom. As the clock ticked down towards the 29th March 2019 the 
sense of urgency increased. This pressured both sides.  The prospect of losing tariff free 
access to the United Kingdom is problematic for the EU as financial journalist Simon 
Lambert (2016) points out:  
Some 44 per cent of our exports in goods and services go to the EU, but 53 per cent of 
our imports of the same come from the bloc. Britain’s balance of payments problem 
might for once be to our advantage here. But break things down to an individual 
country level and Britain’s importance varies. For example, keeping free trade with 
Britain is much more important to Germany, which sells us lots more goods than we 
sell to it, than it is to France or Italy – where the deficit is smaller. (Lambert, 2016)  
  
May’s personal statecraft has manifested the decentering effect of Brexit on state governance.  
The Parliamentary Conservative Party - as one of the two great parties of state - remains 
deeply riven by Brexit. May’s Cabinet was intentionally constructed to guarantee a 
‘pragmatic Remainer’ majority.  Conservatives of this disposition whilst preferring to 
continue the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU pragmatically accept the result of the 
referendum and seek to broker the most advantageous deal to secure an economic partnership 
with the EU. To this end, May’s Cabinet met at Chequers and produced the ‘Chequer’s Plan’ 
which swiftly became the Government White Paper on ‘The Future Relationship between the 
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United Kingdom and the EU’ (HM Government, 2018) published on 12 July 2018. This 
document achieved two specific things.  Firstly, it moved the Government’s agenda on from 
the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech of 2017, which explicitly stated that the United 
Kingdom was leaving the EU:  
We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe. And that is why 
we seek a new and equal partnership – between an independent, self-governing,  
Global Britain and our friends and allies in the EU. Not partial membership of the 
European Union, associate membership of the European Union, or anything that 
leaves us half-in, half-out. We do not seek to adopt a model already enjoyed by other 
countries. We do not seek to hold on to bits of membership as we leave. No, the 
United Kingdom is leaving the European Union. And my job is to get the right deal 
for Britain as we do (May, 2017)   
Secondly, it exposed the Parliamentary Conservative Party’s divergent perspectives.  This 
was seen in the actions and intentions of key members of May’s Cabinet, the Secretary of  
State for Exiting the EU, David Davis, and Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, who resigned. 
Their resignations were in protest of what they interpreted as the Government reneging on the 
commitment stipulated by May in her Lancaster House speech and in the sentiment expressed 
during her Conservative Leadership campaign during a speech to supporters in Birmingham 
when she famously stated that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ (May, 2016).    
These two factors helped to weaken the negotiating posture of the Her Majesty’s Government 
and demonstrate the decentring effects of Brexit.    
From summer to autumn 2018 the ‘Chequers Plan’ evolved into the Draft Agreement 
(DEXEU, 2018), to give it its abbreviated title, and David Davis’ successor at the Department 
for Exiting the European Union (DExEU), Dominic Raab, appeared to be supportive of  
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May’s softer Brexit posture. On 14th November the Draft Agreement was published and  
Raab, followed by fellow Cabinet colleague Esther McVey (Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions), resigned citing a lack of confidence that the Draft Agreement delivers a 
meaningful Brexit and risks disaggregating Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom 
because of the negotiated ‘Irish backstop’. Two days later, Stephen Barclay, Member of  
Parliament for North East Cambridgeshire and a Leave supporter, replaced Raab at DExEU.   
In the four weeks after these resignations the decentering effects of Brexit spilled over from  
Her Majesty’s Government (who on 11th December postponed a vote on the Draft  
Agreement) to the internal management of the Conservative Party. On 12th December 15% of 
the Parliamentary Conservative Party, spearheaded by the European Research Group, 
submitted letters of no confidence in May’s leadership of the Party to Sir Graham Brady, 
Chairman of the 1922 Committee, thus triggering a confidence vote.  Later that evening, after 
the votes were counted, May had achieved a majority of votes: 200 to 117. The 
overwhelming number of her supporters were ‘pay-roll’ votes – members of the Government. 
The media reported that May pledged to resign as Party Leader prior to the 2022 general 
election.    
The opening month of the New Year brought the largest defeat of a Government in the 
modern era of British politics. On 15th January 2019, a mere ten weeks from ‘Brexit day’, 432 
to 202 MPs expressed their deep dissatisfaction in Her Majesty’s Government and in its Draft 
Agreement. This defeat was a marriage of convenience between Brexiteers and ardent  
Remainers; conservatives and progressives; and included MPs from the Conservative Party, 
the Democratic Unionist Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish  
Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru, five independent MPs and, the Green Party MP, Caroline  
Lucas. What could be said with certainty was that the vast majority of the House of 
Commons was in unity against the Draft Agreement. In the immediate aftermath of the 
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defeat, the Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, tabled a motion of no confidence in the 
Government.  The following day the Democratic Unionist Party fulfilled its ‘confidence and 
supply’ agreement with the Conservative minority government to ensure that the motion was 
defeated by 325-306.    
On 12th March Her Majesty’s Government lost the second meaningful vote 242-391 and the 
third meaningful vote 286-344 on what was supposed to be ‘Brexit Day’, 29th March.  After 
such Parliamentary humiliation, despite pledging to the 1922 Committee (the committee of 
Conservative backbench MPs) that she would resign if her deal passed, the Prime Minister  
sought an extension to Article 50 from the European Commission. Preferring either 12th April 
or 22nd May (the day before the 2019 EU Parliament elections) and then 30th June, the Prime 
accepted the EU Commission’s preference of 31st October. At the time of writing, the Prime  
Minister is committed to a further meaningful vote in the House of Commons.  Her Majesty’s 
Government continues to seek to get the Withdrawal Deal through and is working closely 
with the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, the one-time Bennite Eurosceptic whose 
Parliamentary colleagues and activist base is ardently pro-EU, but whose English heartlands 
outside of the capital voted overwhelmingly for Leave. The effects of Brexit as a decentering 
phenomenon remain evident for the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, Her Majesty’s 
Government, the House of Commons in particular and the nation in general.   
  
  
The Imaginings of a Post-EU World  
The third of the three aspects of Brexit, and how it contributes to the decentering of state 
governance, is what can be referred to as the ‘imaginings’ of a post-EU world by competing 
ideational traditions.  These are traditions shaped by values. The phenomenon of Brexit has 
brought into sharp focus the fact that the social fabric of the United Kingdom is riven by the 
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values gap5. The values gap refers to the conflicting sets of values that characterise British, 
and especially, English society. These sharply differing sets of values held by citizens who 
share much in common in terms of their ethnicity, language and culture explain the 
contrasting outlooks over many issues from Brexit to gay marriage to the Human Rights Act 
and patriotism. Goodhart (2017) conceives that British politics is being affected by different 
tribes, some relatively new, and the seemingly tribal character of contemporary Britain is one 
shaped by differing values. The values gap as understood by the author is the principal factor 
behind sociocultural division in contemporary British politics and says something about the 
divide between cosmopolitans and conservatives. This is of particular pertinence for the 
Labour Party whose Parliamentary Party is overwhelmingly cosmopolitan but much of its 
inclined-voter base in the North and the Midlands of England is more culturally and socially 
conservative.  Brexit is neither the cause of a disunited kingdom nor is it part of the origin 
story. In fact, Brexit is a consequence of the growing values gap in British, and especially, in 
English society.   
There are a number of identifiable ‘imaginings’ of the United Kingdom in a post-EU world. 
Some are more obvious than others. The author’s purpose here is not to speculate about each 
specific aspect but to draw out ideational narratives that are presently competing in British 
politics.  
The first group comprise the most ardent Remainers. These pro-EU politicians agitated for  
‘ever closer Union’ and are advocates of a ‘People’s Vote’ or second referendum (Open 
Britain, 2018).  Members of this group are from a number of political parties including 90% 
of Labour MPs (Walker, 2018), the Liberal Democrats, the Greens, the SNP, Plaid Cymru, a 
handful of Conservative MPs and Change UK: The Independent Group. High profile figures 
from this ideational perspective include, Keir Starmer, Tom Watson, Liz Kendall, Vince  
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Cable, Tim Farron, Caroline Lucas, Nicola Sturgeon, Leanne Wood, Dominic Grieve, Chuka 
Umunna, Anna Soubry and Heidi Allen. Their ideational tradition is progressive. They view 
the EU as a repository of progressive values and beliefs and fear that the United Kingdom, 
outside of the EU, will necessitate a more conservative political culture. This goes some way 
to explain their desire to defend the free movement of people, the Single Market and the 
European Court of Justice’s approach to human rights.  For such politicians the EU is a 
bulwark of progressivism against conservative forces within and without the Conservative  
Party. Economically, such political actors insist that the United Kingdom must remain in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) with its Single Market and Customs Union. For them the 
least bad option is the ‘Norway model’. Membership of the EU is a normative rather than a 
pragmatic decision. It is a commitment to cosmopolitanism and globalism.    
The second group can be understood as pragmatic pro-EU politicians. These Remainers 
accept the result of the referendum. The politicians in this group comprise a majority of the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party (Mance and Lindsay, 2017) and a smaller number of  
Labour MPs. They include Prime Minister Theresa May, Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip  
Hammond, Amber Rudd, Dan Jarvis and Gareth Snell. The need to reach a negotiated or 
‘Soft Brexit’ is the marker of this group’s pragmatism. This group supports the Government’s 
deal. They tend to be liberal in economic and social outlook. They agitate for a customs 
agreement rather than a ‘Canada style’ free trade deal.    
The third group are Leavers. Eurosceptic MPs who desire that the United Kingdom extricate 
itself from all EU rationalities. Of this group in the House of Commons the mainstay are 
Conservatives (especially members of the European Research Group) but include a small 
number of Labour members. The most thoroughly Eurosceptic parties are UKIP and the  
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Democratic Unionist Party. Well known Eurosceptics in British public life include Jacob 
Rees-Mogg, Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, David Davis, Steve Baker, Frank 
Field, Kate Hoey, John Mann, Graham Stringer, Arlene Foster and Nigel Dodds.  
The issue of Parliamentary sovereignty, control of British borders and money are of central 
importance for Eurosceptics. There is however no consensus on the type of model the United 
Kingdom should adopt post-EU membership.  Opinion in this group ranges from a ‘Canada 
style’ free trade deal to a ‘Hard Bexit’ where the United Kingdom exits without a deal and 
operates under World Trade Organisation terms. This group is quite ideationally diverse, 
containing socially conservative Parliamentarians who have a high view of Britain’s past and 
its propensity to be rich, safe and free outside of the EU.   Many are economic liberals but the 
Labour and DUP Eurosceptics are advocates of a more interventionist political economy.   
These competing ideational narratives of the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit relationship with 
the EU are contingent. They depend upon the traditions of thought and the webs of values and 
beliefs of elite level political actors. They represent attitudes towards the British state and, 
crucially, towards society. These three groups: ardent Remainers, pragmatic Remainers and 
Leavers are engaged in a contest of values and ideas broadly explained and understood as the 
progressive tradition, the liberal tradition and the conservative tradition.  
  
The vote is the foundational decentring event.  Of the three aspects outlined above, the effect 
of the vote has been felt most strongly throughout the UK and the EU.  In the post 23rd June 
2016 period, the political culture of the UK is mapped and measured by whether one is Leave 
or Remain.  The negotiation, in the period after Article 50 was triggered, has reinforced 
perceptions of Leavers and Remainers.  Her Majesty’s Government’s pursuit of what some 
term a ‘soft Brexit’ pleases few and, at the time of writing, carries no majority in Parliament.  
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The imaginings of a post-EU world serves as a means for scholars to interpret contemporary 
elite level aspirations for future politics rooted in ideational traditions.  
Conclusion  
The British state arguably reached its governing zenith through the crises-stricken 
governments of Clement Attlee in the immediate post-war years.  Yet the degree of economic 
and social reform undertaken is unparalleled from the NHS and national parks to 
nationalisation and full employment. For all of the Labour Party’s internal impediments such 
as vehement policy arguments over rearmament, NATO, the nuclear bomb; distributionist 
debates between Bevanites and Gaitskellites; regular plotting to depose Attlee; the British 
state’s pecuniary vulnerabilities; social democracy was possible. Attlee left the United  
Kingdom, a social democracy, albeit a fragile, American-dependent one. In his day the 
United Kingdom was a kingdom founded upon solid rock, hewn from vast reserves of shared 
values, beliefs and dispositions.  Beneath it lay a broad consensus of ethics and patriotism 
which was formed over many decades but was most crucially fashioned by the collective 
sacrifice during the Second World War.   
  
By the 1970s fissures had appeared in the foundation stone of the British state and they 
widened greatly in the four succeeding decades. The decentred state is a useful explanatory 
tool to explain and understand change in state governance. Brexit is a decentering event, the 
most potent in the post-war era, but not dissimilar in the effects of rupture, shock, schism and 
disputes of the 1970s.  One that continues to affect the British state but also British society. In 
the discussions of the vote, the negotiations and the ‘imaginings’ of a post-EU world one can 
observe contested beliefs, a ‘diversity of governing practices’ and policy dilemmas.  
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By the 23rd June 2016, it became more appropriate to conceive that the boundaries of British 
society had been reached.  Reached not in the sense of having been fully realised but reached 
in the sense that it is no longer meaningful to speak of the British society. Today the United 
Kingdom is more a collection of clefts: English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish; metropolitan 
and provincial; cosmopolitan and nationalist; progressive and conservative; pro-EU and 
Eurosceptic. The United Kingdom does not merely disagree about the lie of the land, but 
about its political map, compass and preferred post-Brexit destination.   
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